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A NOTE ON HINTIKKA'S REFUTATION 
OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
William F. Vallicella 
According to Jaakko Hintikka, "The mistake in the main version of the ontological 
argument ... is an operator-switch fallacy.'" From 
(I) N(Ex) [(y) (y exists -, x exists)] 
one mistakenly infers 
(2) (Ex)N [(y) (y exists -+ x exists)]. 
What (1) says is that, necessarily, there is an individual such that if anything exists, 
it exists. In a possible worlds semantic framework, (1) amounts to the claim that in 
each possible world W there is an individual x such that if anything exists in W, x 
exists in W. This leaves open the possibility that the condition is satisfied by differ-
ent individuals in different possible worlds. That is, it leaves open the possibility 
that, for example, in WI, x = a while in W2, x = b. Thus (I) does not entail (2), 
since (2) says that there is a unique individual, the same in all possible worlds, that 
satisfies the condition. According to Hintikka, " ... the failure of this identity is 
precisely the fatal flaw in the usual versions of the ontological argument." (p. 133) 
Thus for Hintikka the proponent of the ontological argument is either illicitly 
inferring (2) from (1), or else simply confusing the two and trying to derive the 
benefits of both without paying the price of either. (1) is logically true, but trivial. 
(2) is nontrivial, but not logically true. It is only by confusing (1) and (2), that 
"Anselm, Descartes & Co." can claim a result that is both certain and nontrivial. 
Although this diagnosis certainly helps illuminate the issues surrounding the 
ontological argument, it is open to what I think is a fairly obvious objection. 
Let us begin with the admission that the passage from (1) to (2) is a clear non 
sequitur. But what exactly does this have to do with the ontological argument, in 
say Anselm's Proslogion III version? As Hintikka is well aware, his diagnosis 
succeeds only if (1) fairly represents what Anselm thinks he has proven. But is it 
true that "the whole of (1) seems to express quite well the Anselmian idea that the 
most perfect being-a being greater than which cannot be conceived of-must 
necessarily exist ... "? (p. 129) It is hard to see how it does. First of all, (1) 
embodies a questionable assimilation of the ontological to the cosmological 
argument. But we shall let that pass since it seems Hintikka could have made his 
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"operator-switch" point without that assimilation. Secondly, and more impor-
tantly, (1) is trivially true, and as Hintikka admits, "the triviality of (1) is reflected 
by the fact that any existing individual can be chosen as the value of the existen-
tially bound variable 'x' in (1)." (p. 130) Indeed, numerically the same individual 
might be the value of both variables. But if anything can be the value of "x," 
(1) expresses nothing proper to God. For Ronald Reagan also has the property 
of being such that, if anything exists, then he exists. Indeed, everything has this 
property. Thus we must reject Hintikka's claim that "the inside conditional in 
(1), viz. (y) (y exists -> x exists), can be considered as a characterization of god 
(= x), conceived of as the most powerful being with respect to existence." (p. 
129) For, to repeat, simply everything is characterized by this inside conditional! 
The reason is easy to discern. The Philonian (material) conditional is such that 
any two propositions can stand in the relation of material implication provided 
that it is not the case that the antecedent is true and consequent false. Thus "The 
Charles River exists" materially implies "Reagan exists." But this scarcely means 
that one can validly infer the existence of Reagan from the existence of the 
Charles River. The upshot is that (1), pace Hintikka, completely fails to express 
"the Anselmian idea that the most perfect being ... must necessarily exist." 
At the risk of belaboring the obvious, let me make it crystal clear where the 
confusion lies. It lies in the sentence: "Thus the inside conditional in (1), viz. 
(y) (y exists -> x exists), can be considered as a characterization of god (= x), 
conceived of as the most powerful being with respect to existence." The part of 
the sentence before "conceived" is no doubt true, but vacuously so: the inside 
conditional characterizes God by virtue of characterizing everything. But the 
second part of the sentence-the part after "conceived"--contradicts the first 
part. For to conceive God as existentially most powerful is to conceive Him as 
unique, as distinct from all else. Thus the sentence under analysis embodies a 
confusion between a unique and a non-unique characterization of God. Hintikka 
thinks he is giving what is needed, a unique characterization, but he is patently 
failing to do so. 
But this is not all; a further confusion seems to be at work. One way Hintikka's 
claim that "the whole of (1) seems to express quite well the Anselmian idea that 
the most perfect being . . . must necessarily exist" could be true would be if 
the inside conditional in (1) expressed strict, rather than material, implication. 
It would be a unique characterization of God to say of Him that his existence is 
analytically entailed by the existence of any individual whatsoever. For surely 
this does not hold of any individual other than God. But then Hintikka faces a 
dilemma: Either the inside conditional in (1) expresses material implication, or 
it expresses strict implication. If the former, then the inside conditional fails to 
characterize God uniquely, and Hintikka's reconstruction of the ontological argu-
ment fails. If the latter, (1) transmogrifies into (2), as Hintikka is well aware. 
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(p. 132) But if (I) collapses into (2), then there is no longer a basis for Hintikka's 
charge of "operator-switch" fallacy. So either Hintikka fails to reconstruct the 
argument, or he fails to show its invalidity. 
Now Hintikka seems to be aware of something like this objection. His response 
is that "If we try to insert a necessity-operator to front the inner conditional of 
(1), we lose the trivial logical truth of (1)." (p. 132) This is no doubt true, but 
simply throws him back onto the first hom of the dilemma, in which case he 
fails to reconstruct any interesting version of the ontological argument, and 
certainly not the most important version, the one contained in Proslogion llI. 
These remarks may be summed up by saying that Anselm et al. cannot be 
accused of confusing (1) and (2), for (1) has nothing to do with any interesting 
version of the ontological argument inasmuch as (1) fails to characterize God 
uniquely. 
University of Dayton 
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